Honduras and Ukraine: Strategic Drone Cooperation

Analysis

The use of Ukrainian drones in the Honduran context would offer targeted solutions to address the challenges posed by drug cartels and urban gangs therefore leveraging technologies tested in war scenarios. Gangs such as MS13 and Barrio 18 exercise widespread control over urban centers such as Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, dedicating themselves mainly to extortion, local drug trafficking and kidnappings. Other groups such as the Cachiros, Valle, and the Atlantic Cartel have instead handled the transit of cocaine all the way out to the United States.

Ukrainian long-range drones (such as the UJ-22 or Lyutyy) could prove useful tools for monitoring remote areas such as the Mosquita (northeastern Atlantic coast of Honduras), a major hub for shipments of cocaine from Colombia and difficult to patrol by conventional means. Ukraine’s experience with FPV drones and electronic warfare-resilient surveillance systems would also offer police forces a tactical advantage in hostile urban environments.

President Asfura also expressed interest in modernizing his country’s agricultural sector as part of the “Juntos Vamos a Estar Bien” government plan to generate employment and stability. Ukrainian drones designed for agriculture, such as the D-80 Discovery, combined with access to Ukrainian fertilizer, could support such an initiative. Asfura’s “work, work, and more work” policy requires a strong rule of law, and Ukrainian technology could be seen as a means of ensuring the security needed to attract investors.

Figure 3 Personal creation through the use of AI. Sources used: https://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-OWA-UAVs.html, https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/KSE_Institute_Report_Harnessing_Ukraines_Drone_Innovations_to_Advance.pdf

For Ukraine, the partnership with Honduras brings several benefits. First, Kiev is expanding its diplomatic ties in an area of the world where most countries have preferred to stay on the sidelines regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict by favoring dialogue or citing economic interests. Regarding this, President Zelenskyy thanked President Asfura for the support shown by Honduras in international forums, citing in particular the vote in favor of the United Nations General Assembly resolution for lasting peace in Ukraine on February 24.

Zelenskyy also stressed the importance of opposing Russia’s influence in the Americas where Moscow has long operated undisturbed mainly through disinformation and propaganda. The agreement with Honduras could open Latin American markets to the Ukrainian defense industry, which has a production capacity of up to 10 million drones per year, thus countering Russia in one of the key sectors of its influence in the region such as armaments.

The agreement between Honduras and Ukraine would also be of great importance to the United States due to the fact that the US national security document, released in 2025, highlights the fight against drug trafficking as one of the current administration’s priorities. Within this framework, the US “Shield of the Americas” initiative was inaugurated as a new regional security and economic cooperation architecture for the Western Hemisphere, officially launched by the Trump administration in March 2026. It is in Washington’s interest that the agreement between Kiev and Tegucigalpa produces tangible results given President Trump’s support for Asfura during the 2025 election campaign and Honduras’ membership in the “Shield of the Americas.”

Forecasting scenarios

Best Case: Success of the drone agreement

Key hypothesis

• Ukrainian drones are successfully deployed by Honduran armed forces and police thanks to the support provided by Ukrainian consultants who oversee the implementation of their technology and prevent it from being copied or transferred to third-party actors.
• Honduran organized crime is failing to counter Ukrainian technology due to a lack of expertise in the field, unlike Mexican cartels and Colombian armed groups.
• Logistical and intelligence support from the United States, which endorses the agreement to counter organized crime as prescribed by the Donroe Doctrine.

Impacts:

• Drones allow constant monitoring of risk areas, allowing localized attacks against precise targets without sending military personnel on the ground and avoiding possible clashes in densely populated civilian areas.
• Agricultural drones increase the productivity of coffee and cocoa crops then boosting the export of these goods, revenue, investment, and employment.
• Kiev becomes a key defense and security partner for regional governments therefore displacing Russia as an arms supplier.

Strategies:

• Constant monitoring of risk areas (e.g. Mosquitia, San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa) to prevent drug trafficking and gang activities.
• Creation of an elite drone management unit whose members are subjected to rigorous and constant monitoring managed in collaboration with US intelligence and Ukrainian experts from the Brave1 cluster.
• Subsidies to Honduran agricultural enterprises for the purchase and deployment of agricultural drones to maximize production. Local co-production of drone components, stimulating local manufacturing industry and entry into the labor market.

Worst Case: Reverse engineering of Ukrainian technology and escalation of violence

Key hypothesis

• Endemic corruption in Honduras is hindering the effective implementation of drones, with high-level officials (narcopolitics) selling prototypes or access codes for Ukrainian drones to cartels.
• Honduran criminal organizations are able to adapt to Ukrainian technology, developing countermeasures (e.g., electronic warfare, improvised drones) thanks to the advice of Colombian and Mexican armed groups trained in the use of these technologies in Ukraine within the Foreign Legion.
• The state employs armed drones in urban areas without clear rules of engagement thus leading to collateral damage and abuse.

Impacts:

• Pressure on Honduran security forces to show rapid results against organized crime, combined with a manipulable justice system,  leads to the use of drones to target civilians passed off as criminals therefore replicating Colombia’s false-positive cases.
• The cartels employ “combined weapons” tactics, using drones to cover the advance of homemade armored vehicles (monstruos) equipped with anti-drone “cope cages” as the cartels did in Mexico.
• Civilian protests erupt across the country over the lack of results from the Asfura government which fails to deliver the promised security and thus increasing the risk of early elections for minimum approval rates.
• Prisons, already gang operations centers, become logistics hubs where drones smuggle heavy weapons and coordinate external attacks with pinpoint precision.
• The uncontrolled spread of Ukrainian technology into criminal circles across the Americas risks increasing instability in more than 10 countries.

Strategies:

• Creation of an International Commission (similar to the failed CICIH/MACCIH) that specifically monitors the use of military technology assets to prevent human rights abuses.
• Adapt counter-cartel strategies by developing countermeasures against their adaptive capabilities (e.g. electronic warfare, improvised drones).
• Develop international coordination (United States, NATO, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico) to counter mutual support between Mexican, Central American, and South American criminal organizations.

Conclusions

Ukrainian drones could help modernize Honduran defense forces by acting as a force multiplier for territorial control. However, this technology must be integrated into a profound reform of the state that includes the legal certainty promised by Asfura, the fight against internal corruption, and investments in the country’s social fabric.